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Body Polluted: Questions of Scale, Gender and Remedy
Dayna Nadine Scott*
This paper explores whether tort law can provide a remedy for the injury of “endocrine
disruption”, at an individual or a collective level. Many activists in the environmental justice
movement want to be able to say unequivocally that the “gender‐bending” of endocrine
disruption is a new, dramatic and horrifying harm. But taking the example of the declining sex
ratio of the Aamjiwnaang First Nation, a Canadian aboriginal community experiencing chronic
chemical pollution, demonstrates that finding a “harm” or “injury” in law is fraught with
difficulties. On an individual level, an altered sex ratio (the number of boy babies born relative
to the number of girls) cannot constitute a harm. No one mother could ever prove that she
specifically was harmed; that she specifically should have conceived a boy. But her chances of
welcoming a son seem to be less than they should be. The concern, from the perspective of the
First Nation, is essentially one of cultural survival. It is the collective loss of a viable future.
Thus the notion of a collective harm highlights the fact that this problem is situated in the
context of an aboriginal community already struggling, as many are, with stemming the loss of
culture and tradition amongst their people. Further, because emerging environmental health
harms are often localized and concentrated around the worst pollution sources, and because
they tend to be distributed along race and class differentials, endocrine disruption is a central
concern of the environmental justice movement.
Understanding the nature of contemporary pollution harms or ‘injuries’ is essential to the
crafting of effective remedies. In particular, the paper seeks to destabilize the tendency in the
environmental justice movement to conceptualize harms on the basis of unquestioned
assumptions about what is ‘natural’ and what is ‘normal’ that fly in the face of developments in
sex and gender theory. It also seeks to challenge tort scholars to imagine law differently. Legal
scholars have begun exploring the idea that tort law is “too corporeal” ‐‐ that it is tethered too
tightly to proof of physical damages‐‐ and should move towards the recognition of interests‐
based damage assessments in specific contexts. But even where recent scholarship in tort has
included some calls for expansion of what should count as harm or physical damage, the scale
at which we look to find such damage remains primarily at the level of the individual, the single
unitary legal subject. Perhaps, as has been suggested, we should move away from assessing
physical damage only on the basis of a “factually observable” change in the physical structure of
persons, and adopt a more contextual approach based on social perceptions of damage. The
way that pollution manifests, and the blameworthiness of its perpetuation in certain
communities, demands that tort law evolve, and that we, as legal scholars, work creatively to
devise new legal remedies for emerging injuries.
This paper offers a critique of tort remedies grounded in feminist theory of the body. It
exposes how tort law is invested in a notion of an individuated legal subject, which in this case
fails to capture the critical interconnectedness of bodies in a community in a social, political,
historical, and colonial context. The analysis considers various torts on a conceptual level, and
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what they might offer the Aamjiwnaang First Nation in the way of remedies. In each case, what
the tort can do depends on how the injury, and the scale at which the entity taken to have
suffered the injury, is conceived.
The paper finds that none of these remedies are adequately able to account for way the
pollution has saturated the community, been soaked up in bodies, and altered social and
cultural relations. But brainstorming around tort law’s potential remedies, at various scales,
allows for the body to be opened up – for the gender‐bending synthetic chemicals flowing
through bodies to become visible, for their free movement between individuals and their
worlds to be exposed ‐‐ to the point that our insistence on a fixed bodily boundary, and a
centrally controlled self, begins to break down. Further, the analysis demonstrates that the
scale at which we conceive of an ‘injury’ shapes the determination of whether the injury is seen
as “remediable”, and on what terms. These conceptions and determinations then, in turn,
shape ideas about the allocation of blame for the harm. Essentially, the argument is that our
constructions of ‘injury’ – where and how we choose to find it ‐ carry consequences for
communities affected by contemporary pollution harms.
The paper consists of three parts. In the first part, I review the contamination of the
Aamjiwnaang First Nation, and describe how the struggle of this small reserve community, and
their campaign against endocrine disruption, has garnered the attention of environmental
justice activists worldwide.1 In the second part, I explain how tort law might conceive of the
harm or the ‘injury’ that is visited on the Aamjiwnaang community, including what the gender
dimension of that harm might be. Finally, in the third part, I begin to brainstorm around the
way that various torts might operate at different scales of injury to provide a remedy for the
Aamjiwnaang people.

I. PART I: THE CONTAMINATION OF AAMJIWNAANG FIRST NATION
For the residents of Aamjiwnaang First Nation, living in the shadow of Canada’s “Chemical
Valley”, a recent epidemiological study confirmed what they had suspected for years ‐ that the
* Assistant Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto, Canada, dscott@osgoode.yorku.ca. The
author would like to thank the organizers and participants of the “Injuries Without Remedies” 2010 Access to
Justice Symposium at Loyola Law School, March 26, 2010, especially Anne Bloom, without whose enthusiasm and
encouragement this paper would not have been completed. The symposium was thought‐provoking and
challenging, and I benefitted tremendously. I also benefitted from the invitation to present the work‐in‐progress
at a faculty seminar at the University of Western Ontario Law School in March 2010. Nicole Letourneau provided
expert research assistance.
1

This case study draws largely on work that has been published elsewhere: Dayna Nadine Scott, ““Gender‐
Benders”: Sex and Law in the Constitution of Polluted Bodies”, (2009) 17 Fem. Legal Stud. 241 and Dayna Nadine
Scott, “Confronting Chronic Pollution: A Socio‐Legal Analysis of Risk and Precaution” (2008) 46:2 Osgoode Hall L.J.
293.
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community’s “sex ratio” (the number of boy babies born relative to the number of girls) is
declining at an alarming rate. It is widely speculated that chronic exposure to toxic chemical
pollution, specifically a group of endocrine‐disrupting chemicals provocatively nicknamed the
“gender‐benders”, is responsible.
The Aamjiwnaang First Nation is a community of approximately 900 Aanishinaabek people
living on a reserve located immediately adjacent to Sarnia’s notorious petrochemical corridor.
This area of southwestern Ontario, located at the southern tip of Lake Huron, bordering
Michigan, USA, houses one of Canada’s largest concentrations of industry, including several
large petrochemical, polymer, and chemical industrial plants, as well as coal‐fired utilities on
both sides of the border.2 In recent years, residents began to wonder about why they were
starting to require two softball teams to accommodate the girls on reserve, and they could
barely field one team of boys.3 Soon, they had documented a marked decrease in the number
of males born into their community. An investigation was launched to explain this
phenomenon, and the Aamjiwnaang First Nation now has the unwelcome distinction of the
world’s lowest documented birth ratio.4
The study suggests that the noted decline in sex ratio could be correlated with the community
members’ exposure to industrial pollutants.5 Other studies conducted in this region have found
changes in the sex ratios and reproductive ability of fish, bird, and turtle populations, which are
thought to be due to exposures to endocrine‐disrupting chemicals. Endocrine disruptors are
said to have a “hormone‐mimicking” effect. They may induce long‐term effects upon low‐dose
exposures in susceptible developmental phases. There are a number of competing hypotheses
for how, specifically, these environmental contaminants disrupt the human endocrine system,
and how they might be influencing sex ratio. According to the hypothesis with the most
traction, interference with a mother’s hormonal milieu at key developmental stages very early
in a pregnancy can induce sex‐specific mortality in miscarriage. Essentially, the hypothesis is
that embryos that would become boy babies are disproportionately lost in early miscarriages,
usually occurring before the prospective mother even becomes aware that she may have been
pregnant.
Advocates railing against chronic pollution and contamination are increasingly identifying with
and being inspired by the environmental justice movement. These activists see “connections
2

Elaine MacDonald and Sarah Rang, “Exposing Canada’s Chemical Valley: An Investigation of Cumulative Air
Pollution Emissions in the Sarnia, Ontario Area” (Toronto: Ecojustice, 2007) at 5, online:
http://www.ecojustice.ca/publications/reports/report‐exposing‐canadas‐chemical‐valley/attachment>
[MacDonald, Exposing Canada’s Chemical Valley].
3

Personal communication with Ada Lockridge, Health and Environment Committee Chair, Aamjwnaang First Nation
(26 March 2008).
4

Mary Ann Cohlihan, “Chemical Valley: Aamjiwnaang First Nation in Sarnia Sounds Alarm Over Toxins” CBC News In
Depth (1 April 2008), online: <http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/aboriginals/health.html>.

5

Constance A. MacKenzie, Ada Lockridge and Margaret Keith, "Declining Sex Ratio in a First Nation Community"
(2005) 113 Envtl Health Perspectives 1295.
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between social welfare and the environment, pollution and the home, and pollution and
discrimination, that have gone unnoticed (or conveniently ignored) by mainstream
environmentalists”.6 A central focus is the notion of “disproportionate burdens” — the claim
that while pollution is everywhere, it is most easily found in a few choice places, particularly
those inhabited by the poor, the racialized, and the marginalized.7 The focus of organizing is on
the fundamental power differential that exists between the polluters and the polluted. As a
result, many activists in the environmental justice movement want to be able to say
unequivocally that the “gender‐bending” of endocrine disruption is a new, dramatic and
horrifying harm.
The central claim of the environmental justice movement ‐‐ that some of us live more
downstream than others ‐‐ is a stark and obvious truth in Sarnia’s Chemical Valley. Talfourd
Creek gathers its waters in an industrial corridor home to 40% of Canada’s chemical production
before it meanders through the Aamjiwnaang reserve and empties into the St. Clair River.
There are 62 large emitting industrial facilities within 25 kilometers of the reserve.8 In 2005
there were 5.7 million kilograms of toxic air pollutants released from the facilities on the
Canadian side of the border alone. The Aamjiwnaang First Nation, confined to a small portion
of their traditional territory by colonialist law, has been steadily surrounded by industry and
many residents now feel that it is being slowly choked out by the legacy of a century of
petrochemical production.9
Contamination of their bodies and their traditional territory has had an enormous emotional
effect on the community. While the skewed sex ratio may be a potent symbol of the complexity
of contemporary pollution harms, it is by no means the only manifestation of the pervasive,
diffuse, and body‐altering pollution that the residents report. They experience elevated rates
of cancer and diabetes, developmental and attention‐deficit disorders, asthma and other
respiratory ailments. The recent years have witnessed a building anger as residents learn of the
extent of their health problems and the mounting evidence linking those problems to the
actions of their industrial neighbors.10 They are a deeply injured community.

6

Robert R.M. Verchick, “In a Greener Voice: Feminist Theory and Environmental Justice” (1996) 19 Harv. Womens’s
L.J. 23 at 46.

7

Timothy W. Luke, “Rethinking Technoscience in Risk Society: Toxicity as Textuality” in Richard Hofritcher, ed.,
Reclaiming the Environmental Debate: The Politics of Health in a Toxic Culture (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press,
2000) 239 [Luke, Rethinking Technoscience in Risk Society].
8

MacDonald, Exposing Canada’s Chemical Valley, supra note 2 at 5.

9

Dayna Nadine Scott,.”Confronting Chronic Pollution: A Socio‐Legal Analysis of Risk and Precaution” (2008) 46(2)
Osgoode Hall L.J. 293 at 298. [Scott, Confronting Chronic Pollution].
10

Community member comments (presented at the Aaamjiwnaang Environmental Health Symposium, Sarnia,
Ontario, March 27, 2008) [notes on file with author].
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II. PART II: IDENTIFYING THE INJURY
Communities struggling with contamination face significant challenges in seeking to achieve
‘environmental justice’ through tort litigation.11 These “toxic torts” are, in fact, notoriously
difficult to win; the ‘injury’ suffered by the Aamjiwnaang First Nation is a classic example of how
contemporary pollution harms are currently beyond the reach of effective resolution through
tort law.
To find an injury in law we need to identify a cause‐and‐effect relationship that culminates in a
tangible harm. Not only is the causality contested in this case, but a tangible harm is elusive.
Thinking specifically of the issue of the declining sex ratio, how should we characterize what has
been lost in the Aamjiwnaang situation? Only chances ‐ chances to welcome sons. No one
mother could ever prove that she specifically was harmed; that she specifically should have
conceived a boy. No actual child has been harmed. But it is difficult to fathom that there is no
harm being done. It is clear that there is wounding to be accounted for.
Cultural anthropologist Lochlann Jain employs the term “wound” to capture the sense that
harms exist out there in the world that are not contained in the legal notion of “injury” .12 And,
as she reminds us, “wellness and wounding will always be at play within various cross‐cutting
hierarchies” pre‐existing in our society 13 “[W]ounding itself”, Jain states, “brings a mode of
attention to objects into being…objects only emerge as separate from the [agent] when
something goes wrong”.14 It is as if the chronic chemical pollution in the streams, rivers, air,
and soil of the Aamjiwnaang reserve is suddenly rendered visible by the duly documented
epidemiological study of the plummeting sex ratio.
How should we understand the harm or the injury that the Aamjiwnaang community has
suffered, and continues to suffer? Or, as a colleague (half‐jokingly) put it to me, “What’s the
harm in a few less men?” Why does this sex ratio dynamic, a declining proportion of boys born
into a community, present a challenge to tort law? In this part, I employ Jain’s critique of
“injury” in law to unpack the issue of harm presented by this particular environmental health
problem.
Jain observes that tort law’s prerequisite is that the (injured) “physical body …come[] to the
table as a preceding artefact being reclaimed after having been unjustly altered” .15 It is offered
up as collateral for the “justness” of a legal logic through which certain practices, like the
11

Melissa Toffolon‐Weiss & J Timmons Roberts, “Toxic Torts, Public Interest Law and Environmental Justice:
Evidence from Louisiana” (2004) 26(2) Law & Pol’y 259.
12

Sarah Lochlann Jain, Injury: The Politics of Product Design and Safety Law in the United States (Princeton, New
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2006) at 6 [Jain, The Politics of Product Design].
13

Ibid. at 5.

14

Ibid.

15

Ibid. at 6.

8

CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES

[VOL. 06 NO. 05

discharge of endocrine disrupting chemicals into the environment, in theory, become morally
reprehensible or unacceptable. But, on top of the inability of the Aamjiwnaang community to
produce a single or distinct injured body, “unjustly altered”, the chronic low‐dose exposures to
pollution that are suspected to be responsible for the ‘injury’ are (for the most part, at least)
legally sanctioned, and permitted. The actions of the corporate polluters, instead of being seen
as morally reprehensible, are in fact state‐sanctioned acts of productive economic activity.
In this respect, law appears ambivalent to the endocrine disrupting pollution. The basis upon
which the prevailing regulatory approach rests is that pollution is permitted according to
certain specified limits or standards set down in a regulation, and in the rare case where this
legally‐sanctioned pollution results in proven harm, the state relies on tort law to step in and
provide compensation.16 Civil remedies, between individuals, were long ago dismissed as being
ineffective as legal tools for the general systemic control of pollution (although they continue to
be relied upon to ‘pick up the slack’ when things go wrong). A regulatory approach was judged
to be more effective.
The regime is typically administered by technical agencies staffed with scientific and
engineering experts focused on determining the “safe” levels of various pollutants in the
environment. The job is one of identifying pollution sources, bringing them under permit, and
then controlling the quality and quantity of emissions discharged through the terms and
conditions of the permit. The underlying assumption is that the natural environment can be
used to assimilate (dilute and cleanse) the waste generated through human activity. This
remains the basis for the contemporary regulatory regime: typically, the governing statute
contains a general discharge prohibition on contaminants in combination with the issuance of
permits for emissions in accordance with a “certificate of approval” issued by the relevant
authority.17 The certificate of approval is a legally binding license that sets out the conditions
under which a facility can operate, including, often, the maximum permissible contaminant
emission levels.
The ambivalence of our law, then, derives from the continued prominence of the
understanding of environmental health harms as incidental, and not central, to industrial
production. Any harm caused by legally sanctioned, permitted pollution (as most of it is in
Sarnia’s chemical corridor) is treated as a by‐product or an accidental side effect of the
economic activity. It remains “unintentional”. And yet, pollution is a “fixed feature” of modern
economies.18 As Richard Lazarus has noted, “pollution in our regulatory environment finds the
pathway of least resistance. It finds those places where the laws are least enforced and least
16

The regulation in effect in Sarnia is Air Pollution – Local Air Quality O. Reg. 419/05 under the Ontario
Environmental Protection Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. E.19 [OEPA].

17
18

In Ontario, it is the OEPA, ss. 6(1), 9(1).
Luke, Rethinking Technoscience in Risk Society, supra note 7 at 248.
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understood”.19 The production of chemicals, the refining of oil, and the generation of
electricity in the Sarnia corridor has harm and wounding embedded in it. It is equally the
production of pollution.

A. “WOUNDING”
“Wounds adhere differently to different people”.20 And the act of wounding, as Jain shows,
focuses attention on things which were previously not clearly in view. But the fact that the
chronic contamination of the Aamjiwnaang territory was only rendered visible by the sudden
notoriety of having the world’s lowest birth ratio, is also largely due to the nature of toxic
chemical pollution. It is invisible. The “risks” associated with it are virtually undetectable
without scientific investigation. They manifest as “harms caused by molecules”.21 To
understand the mechanics of endocrine disruption, for example, the way that certain chemicals
mimic hormones in the body by binding with available receptors and influencing gene
expression, we are forced to rely on biomedical ways of knowing. The consequences of
exposure tend to eventually manifest themselves in ways that start from within the body and
work their way out.22 Further, the latency period associated with many contemporary
environmental health risks underscores their psychological impact in that it renders the
experience of risk unbounded: “an ‘all clear’ is never sounded”.23 Bodies contain chemicals
banned years before the individual’s birth; contamination can be extremely long‐lasting, and
can be passed down from generation to generation. For example, in part because it is widely
accepted among epidemiologists that exposures to toxic chemicals in one generation may
produce effects in the next, no one can tell the Aamjiwnaang community whether they face a
present danger, or are experiencing the latent manifestation of exposures long past: as one
Band member states, “was it me, was it my dad, my mom?...we don’t know who’s been
exposed”.24

B. THE GENDERING EFFECT OF ENDOCRINE DISRUPTION
The mechanics of endocrine disruption are often described in the following way. Certain
synthetic chemicals share structural features with common sex hormones; these chemicals, or
‘xenoestrogens’, mimic hormone action in the body by binding with, and activating, available
19
20

Richard J. Lazarus, “Fairness in Environmental Law” (1997) .27 Envtl. L. 705 at 714.
Jain, The Politics of Product Design, supra note 12 at 58.

21

Carl F. Cranor, Toxic Torts: Science, Law and the Possibility of Justice (New York: Cambridge University Press,
2006) at 12.

22

Kai Erikson, “A New Species of Trouble” in Steven R. Couch & J. Steven Kroll‐Smith, eds, Communities At Risk:
Collective Responses to Technological Hazards, (New York: Peter Lang, 1991) 11 at 21.

23
24

Ibid.

Ron Plain, "The Costs of Chronic Pollution: Stories from the Aamjiwnaang First Nation" (Lecture delivered at the
"Exposing Canada's Toxic Shame" event, Faculty of Environmental Studies, York University, 12 March 2008) [notes
on file with author].
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hormone receptors.25 The endocrine systems of the body are understood as responsible for
regulating complex and interconnected physiological processes, and thus synthetic chemicals
that interfere with these systems are thought to have profound and wide‐ranging effects on
health.26 As hormones travel in the blood in very small concentrations, even very low levels of
xenoestrogens can disrupt the flow of internal communications, triggering biological responses
and functions in the processes of growth and embryonic development. Accordingly,
susceptibility to xenoestrogens is thought to depend highly on sex and on the timing of
exposures.
We rarely hear about the phenomenon of endocrine disruption without reference to the
controversial theory of “feminization”.27 This posits that we are experiencing, not just in
humans but also in animal species throughout the industrialized world, a feminization trend
that is observable across a variety of markers including decreased sperm counts, increasing
testicular cancers, declining levels of testosterone, and high incidence of undescended testes.28
“These things theoretically have a common etiology”, according to Dr. Devra Davis.29 It is
hypothesized that a declining sex ratio may be just one of a number of manifestations of a
feminization trend that is tied to endocrine disruption as very broadly experienced across the
industrialized world.
The gender dimension of the ‘harm’ experienced by the Aamjiwnaang community is as difficult
to demonstrate as it is to dismiss. The impact of pollution seems not only to be gendered, but
gendering. By this I mean that the endocrine disruptors do not just dole out their
environmental health horrors disproportionately as between men and women, or girls and
boys, they actually seem to be driving whether we get girls or boys. The pollution is feared to
be actively “producing” gender.
25

The term “hormone‐mimics” was made popular through the very influential 1997 book Our Stolen Future, which
is said to have done for endocrine disruption what Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring did for pesticides, in terms of
inspiring an environmental movement. Theo Colborne, Dianne Dumanoski & John Peterson Myers, Our Stolen
Future: Are we Threatening our Fertility, Intelligence and Survival? (New York:Plume, 1997).
26

For a description of the mechanics of endocrine disruption from the perspective of contemporary science, see
Solomon, G.M. and Schettler, T. (2000). Environment and health: Endocrine disruption and potential human health
implications. Canadian Medical Association Journal, 163 (11), 1471–1476. For a compelling account of how
hormones emerged out of the historically and socially specific conditions of endocrine research environments in
the early 20th century, see Nelly Oudshoorn, Beyond the Natural Body: An Archeology of Sex Hormones
(Routledge, 1994). I am grateful to Mariana Valverde for putting me onto the critical work of Nelly Oudshorrn.
27

Martin Mittlesteadt “Humanity at Risk: Are the Males Going First” The Globe & Mail (20 September 2008) Focus,
F4.
28

Nancy Langston also attributes rising “rates of intersexuality” to endocrine disruption. “The Retreat From
Precaution: Regulating Diethylstilbestrol (DES), Endocrine Disruptors, and Environmental Health” (2008) 13:1
Environmental History 41.
29

Davis is quoted in Mittlesteadt 2008.
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The Aamjiwnaang experience is marked by the individual trauma of repeated miscarriage and
the collective loss of a viable future. The skewed sex ratio, conceptualized as a ‘harm’, is one
that is both visited specifically on women, and felt by the community as a whole. As Joanne
Conaghan has argued and the previous part has made clear, harm is an “unstable, slippery
concept, highly dependent on context and very much the subject of interpretation”.30 But at
the same time, as Robin West has argued, the question of what constitutes a “harm” is central
to legal theory.31 Further, the question is a critical one for feminists: as Martha Chamallas and
Linda Kerber have shown, tort law traditionally falters when it is faced with claims based on
harms for which there is no “precise masculine analog”.32
According to Robin West’s “connection thesis,” women’s material connection to future human
life necessarily produces a gendered notion of harm.33 The prospect of pregnancy, of
contributing to a future generation, marks the key difference between women and men.
Underlying all branches of feminist theory, West says, is the notion that “women’s existential
state…is grounded in women’s unique potential for physical, ‘material connection’ to human
life”.34 This is the one place where even feminism’s divisions dissolve: we all come together,
she says, on the “discovery or rediscovery of the importance of women’s fundamental material
difference from men”.35
…Women are actually or potentially materially connected to other human life. Men aren’t.
This material fact has existential consequences...[it] defines women’s subjective,
phenomenological and existential state, just as surely as the inevitability of material
separation from the other defines men’s existential state .36
Somewhat predictably, then, Aamjiwnaang mothers and potential mothers, even if they are not
uniquely “harmed”, are usually identified as the medium through which the poisoning occurs:
they are seen as sites of contamination. The notion of the mothers as mediums for the
pollution is reinforced by various strategies of resistance that have been employed by residents
of the Aamjiwnaang community themselves, including “body burden” testing and “body
mapping” exercises, and even self‐help strategies such as leaving the reserve when trying to

30

Joanne Conaghan, “Law, Harm and Redress: A Feminist Perspective” (2002) 22(3) L.S. 319 at 320 [Conaghan, Law,
Harm and Redress]..
31

Robin West, Caring for Justice (New York: New York University Press, 1997) at 94.

32

Martha Chamallas & Linda K. Kerber, “Women, Mothers and the Law of Fright: A History” (1990) 88:4 Mich. L.
Rev. 814 at 814.
33

Robin West, “Jurisprudence and Gender” (1988) 55 U. Chicago L. Rev. 1 at 14 [West, Jurisprudence and Gender].

34

Ibid.

35

Ibid.

36

Ibid.
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become or once becoming pregnant.37 This is true even as the epidemiological evidence
remains contested as to the significance of the maternal influence. In fact, the scientific
literature that links endocrine disruptors with skewed sex ratios focuses on male and female
reproduction, with researchers often unwilling to make a call at this point as to which is the
more likely mode of action.
Sex is typically understood as “a stable and pre‐cultural biological reality that may be assessed
and verified through a visual assessment”38 while gender is often understood to be socially
constructed – a product of our socialization. But it is not just gender that is constructed, of
course, it is sex as well. In the present example, focusing our gaze on the declining sex ratio
and the mechanics of endocrine disruption brings the body into focus and exposes the active
construction and categorization of bodies into discrete sexes.
Conventional wisdom holds that sexual identity occurs ‘naturally’ as a binary category, which
consists of two ‘opposite’ sexes: male and female.39 That there are only two mutually exclusive
categories is not questioned in the environmental health movement. But as the growing
literature on intersexuality makes clear, “many bodies, even in “nature”, simply do not fit very
well into the rigid boundaries of a male/female classification”.40 Conservative estimates put the
incidence of intersexuality at around 1 in 2000 births, with as many as 1 in 100 of us born with
bodies “differing” from the standard traits of male or female. Where we draw the line between
“male” and “female” is now recognized as arbitrary, and sex is better understood as occupying
a continuum.41
But, many will protest, surely genetics settles the matter conclusively: it is the presence or
absence of the Y chromosome that creates a binary. Students of introductory biology courses
may recall a standard narrative something along these lines: A person’s sex is predetermined in
the sperm gamete. The cells of the egg gamete all possess the XX sex chromosomes. Around half
of the sperm gametes contain the X chromosome and others possess the Y chromosome. In
light of this, there are two possibilities that can occur during fertilisation between male and
female gametes, XX and XY. Since sperm are the variable factor, they are responsible for
determining sex…
37

These strategies were shared with me by members of the Aamjiwnaang First Nation at the Aamjiwnaang
Environmental Health Symposium, Sarnia (26 March 2008) [notes on file with author].
38

Anne Bloom, Sex, Bodies, Torts (2009) [unpublished manuscript, on file with author] at 9 [Bloom, Sex, Bodies,
Torts].

39

Ibid.

40

Ibid. at 3.

41

Jennifer L. Nye, ”The Gender Box” (1998) 13 Berkeley Women’s L.J. 226 at 229.

See also Carissima Mathen, “Transgendered Persons and Feminist Strategy” (2004) 16 C.J.W.L. 291 at 307.
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In life, it turns out, it is more complicated. In some cases, babies are born with an extra X or an
extra Y, and some babies are born with only one X.42 In many more cases, babies are born with,
or individuals develop later in their life, physical traits that do not comport with the category
designated to them. For example, some XX individuals have both ovaries and the reproductive
equipment we might typically associate with a male. And in many more cases still, individuals
exhibit personality traits, or gender identities, that puts them on a collision course with
prevailing cultural expectations about the characteristics that are typically associated with the
two categories of sex identity. If this all seems new, it is because, as Anne Bloom demonstrates
beautifully, several authoritative discourses and institutions (law and medicine chief among
them) have “collaborated” so as “to make binary sexual difference appear more “natural” than
it is”.43
Hormones, of course, are implicated as well. According to the standard line, sex is determined
by genetic factors, and sexual differentiation is driven by hormones. As Nelly Oudshoorn’s work
exposes, the “discovery” of hormones early in the twentieth century became celebrated as
providing the “missing link” between genetic and physiological models of sex determination.44
It quickly became accepted that the “intentions of genes must always be carried through by
appropriate hormones”.45 Accordingly, hormones assumed the role of the “chemical
messengers” of masculinity and femininity.46
If there is no “natural” categorization of sexual identity as a binary, perhaps there is no
“normal” balance between two discrete sexes.47 Without these critical assumptions in place, it
is difficult to characterize the declining sex ratio of the Aamjiwnaang First Nation, even at a
collective level, as a harm. If not through recourse to what is “natural”, on what basis can we
determine that endocrine disruption, or pollution, ever, is harmful? Can we say that uninvited
changes to bodies are unwelcome? That just as ‘risks’, however rational to incur at a societal
level, are unacceptable if they are imposed involuntarily or if they result in the unfair sharing of
benefits and burdens,48 so the uninvited interference with bodies, with reproduction, in this
case, is unacceptable?
42
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One answer is that we validate the harms of the pollution that are tied to illness and suffering
and not those that signify difference. Those harmed by the pollution are the people living in
Aamjiwnaang – they are the women, men and children, mostly girls, but nevertheless the
children of the Band. They are the “young aboriginal mothers, they are parents who routinely
receive “emergency alerts” over the radio indicating that they should “Shelter in Place” as a
result of an incident or a “fugitive release” from neighboring industry, they are daycare workers
responding to the sirens by shuffling toddlers inside and closing the vents, they are health clinic
staff staring down bewildering statistics, they are teenagers struggling with asthma,
developmental and attention‐deficit disorders, and they are young children prevented from
swimming in the contaminated creek that passes through their traditional powwow grounds”.49
These are the people living with the effects of the chronic exposures to pollution that emanate
from Sarnia’s Chemical Valley. The community has more than its fair share of illness and
suffering: 17% of adults and 22% of children surveyed have asthma; about 25% of adults
experience high blood pressure and/or chronic headaches; about 25% of children suffer from
learning disabilities and behavioural problems; and about 40% of women have experienced
miscarriage or stillbirth.50
Another answer is that we adopt an “embodied” approach that validates the real and material
consequences that the pollution is having within bodies. Instead of insisting on some “unified
and singular bodily form of the male and the female” this approach would place attention on
the universal human condition of being “in” our bodies.51 Human embodiment spans all sorts
of biological imperatives: from hunger and excretion to aging and dying. It also includes change
through various life stages driven by hormonal cycles. These cycles create ‘windows of
vulnerability’ that have a distinct biological and thus gendered nature.52 It is here that
estrogens take on a pivotal role, and the role of xenoestrogens, in particular, becomes salient.
When synthetic chemicals, uninvited, take over for hormones, binding with available receptors
and orchestrating physiological processes, it has real, tangible, material consequences for
bodies. When this happens in the context of reproduction, it has gendering consequences.
Here, in the context of endocrine disruption on an aboriginal reserve surrounded by
petrochemical production, these answers are attractive because they seem to offer the
potential to underscore the blameworthiness of the ongoing pollution. But it is clear: the harm
to the community’s sex ratio is a harm in the abstract. Why should the declining sex ratio
garner so much attention when the actual suffering and poor health of living beings ‐‐ women,
49
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men and children ‐‐ attracts only indifference and dismissal? This brings us back to the glaring
unfairness of the pollution’s disproportionate impact on the native community in the context of
their colonial history. In fact, understanding why the effects of chronic pollution might be
manifest first on the Aamjiwnaang reserve and not in ‘white’ Sarnia goes a long way to re‐
centering the role of land, capital, race and colonization. The Aanishinaabek people have
occupied their lands at the southernmost tip of Lake Huron for hundreds of years. As band
member Ron Plain will tell you, on the Aamjiwnaang burial grounds, you will find the remains of
four generations of his ancestors, all in one place, literally on the fenceline of a large refinery:
“we all lived here – all our lives”.53 The permanence of both the pollution and of the
Aamjiwnaang First Nation on the landscape, offers a possible explanation for why we might see
a disproportionate effect of chronic pollution on this community: they are grounded both
spatially and historically. If the mechanism behind the decline in sex ratio has a generational
component, it makes sense that it would emerge in the First Nation community first. In south
Sarnia, for example, which might experience comparable exposures to airborne pollutants, you
are likely to find people who were born all over the country, if not the world. On the
Aamjiwnaang reserve, you will not. It is a stark reminder of how contemporary pollution exists
in social contexts that can exacerbate its effects.

C. COLLECTIVE HARM
The impact of the pollution on the Aamjiwnaang people is imposed not only on individual
bodies, of course, but on the community as a whole. In fact, it is through the work of feminist
legal scholars towards exposing the nature of ‘gendered harm’ that we have come to clearly
understand that “injury has a social as well as an individual dimension”.54 As Joanne Conaghan
states, a person’s membership in a “particular class, group, race or gender can significantly
shape the nature and degree of harm they sustain”.55 It is in this vein that I turn next to the
notion of a “collective harm” in the hopes that it can better capture the wounds flowing from
the sex ratio skewing on the Aamjiwnaang reserve. As one band member has stated: “our
daughters will have to go outside our community for their partners”.56 The concern is
essentially one about cultural survival. It is the collective loss of a viable future. Thus the
notion of a collective harm highlights the fact that this problem is situated in the context of an
aboriginal community already struggling, as many are, with stemming the loss of culture and
tradition amongst their people.
53

Ron Plain, supra note 24.

54

Joanne Conaghan, “Gendered Harms and the Law of Tort: Remedying (Sexual) Harassment” (1996) 16:3 Oxford J.
of Legal Stud 407at 408 [Conaghan, Gendered Harms]. See also Adrian Howe, “The Problem of Privatized Injuries:
Feminist Strategies for Litigation” in Martha Albertson & Nancy Sweet Thomadsen eds., At the Boundaries of Law:
Feminism and Legal Theory (New York: Routledge, 1991). See also Conaghan, Law, Harm and Redress, supra note
29. See also Joanne Conaghan and W. Mansell, The Wrongs of Tort (London: Pluto Press, 1993) [Conaghan and
Mansell, The Wrongs of Tort]. See also Leslie Bender, “Feminist (Re)torts: Thoughts on the Liability Crisis, Mass
Torts, Power and Responsibilities” (1990) 37 Duke L.J. 848.
55
56

Conaghan, Gendered Harms, supra note 54 at 408.
Ron Plain, supra note 24.

16

CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES

[VOL. 06 NO. 05

“Injury”, as David Engels argues, “opens a window onto identity”.57 This is because “[w]hen we
say that an individual has suffered an injury, we implicitly refer to a self that is constituted in a
particular way and is therefore vulnerable to particular kinds of harm”.58 It is the specific
history of the Aamjiwnaang First Nation which makes the community, as a whole, particularly
vulnerable to pollution harm. As Robert Verchick makes clear,
localized environmental hazards do not simply harm individuals, they erode family ties
and community relationships…[they] create community‐wide stress that will debilitate
the neighborhood in emotional, sociological, and economic ways. To ignore this
communal harm is to underestimate severely the true risk involved.59
Further, following Verchick, because emerging environmental health harms are often localized
and concentrated, and because they tend to be distributed along race and class differentials,
the wound to the affected community, in this case the Aamjiwnaang First Nation, takes on a
“profound moral character”.60
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As profound a wound as it is, it is clear that locating an ‘injury’ in individuals is not easy. Even
locating a harm at the collective level is fraught with difficulty: conceptualizing the wound
suffered by the Aamjiwnaang (at least in terms of the declining sex ratio) as a harm in fact
demands allegiance to notions of what is ‘natural’ and what is ‘normal’ that fly in the face of
developments in sex and gender theory. Contemporary pollution harms are diffuse, body‐
altering, cumulative, and probably generational in character. There is wounding to be
accounted for, but it is the kind of harm that pushes the limits of our current legal imaginary.

III. PART III: IMAGINING A REMEDY
A tort is a legal construct: it only exists in cases where there is a “wrong” for which the law
provides a remedy.61 In general, tort law provides that compensation, usually in the form of
money damages, be paid for an injury suffered as a result of the wrongful conduct of others.
Can tort law provide a remedy for the injury suffered by the Aamjiwnaang First Nation? In the
first part of what follows, I offer a critique of tort damages as based on the idea of a liberal,
individual legal subject grounded in feminist theory of the body. In the second part, I engage in
a somewhat creative, or perhaps playful, take on torts in which I consider various torts on a
conceptual level, and what they might offer the Aamjiwnaang First Nation in the way of
remedies. In each case, what the tort can do depends on how the injury, and the scale at which
the entity taken to have suffered the injury, is conceived.

A. BEYOND INDIVIDUAL LEGAL SUBJECTS
The central difficulty for tort law in providing an effective remedy to the Aamjiwnaang
community derives from its underlying assumption that “society is composed of free, separate,
autonomous individuals, competing with each other in pursuit of their own self‐interest”.62 The
definition of tort law is that it is the law governing the obligations that persons are deemed to
owe each other.63 This is where a feminist critique gains traction. Where “tort law, as
traditionally presented, presupposes the essential separateness of individuals from each other,
feminist perspectives recognize, from the very outset, our necessary interconnectedness”.64
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Robin West, as noted in Part II, challenges the notion of “separateness” for women based on
her connection thesis: “women are not essentially, necessarily, inevitably, invariably, always
and forever separate from other human beings”.65 Her thesis is strengthened by emerging
work by scholars of fetal microchimerism, such as Aryn Martin, who demonstrates that, not
only is women’s “separateness” challenged by the possibility of reproduction, but the maternal
body is “irretrievably transformed by the experience of pregnancy”.66 As these scholars have
demonstrated, the boundaries of human individuality are permanently blurred by the fluid
movement and exchange of cells that occurs between a mother and her fetus. Children of all
genders will forever harbor cells belonging to their mothers within their own bodies. And so we
can take the challenge to the separation thesis much deeper: not only can women not be
conceived of as “separate” from other life, but men cannot either. All living things are
embedded and interwoven into larger webs of being.
The idea of humans as organisms embedded in dynamic systems invites a Deleuzian conception
of the body, which does not rely on an individuated subject.67 As Elizabeth Grosz argues, we
need to understand the body “not as an organism or entity in itself, but as a system, or a series
of open‐ended systems, functioning within other huge systems it cannot control…”68 Applying
this perspective places the Aamjiwnaang people as subjects immersed in a social, ecological,
political and historical context that accentuates their vulnerabilities to the pollution – to the
intensities and flows operating at a molecular level, to the energies and connections between
synthetic hormones and available receptors within bodies. In emphasizing the capacity of
bodies to affect and be affected by other bodies, this conception, therefore, “undermines a
notion of a fixed boundary between subject and object and between the self and its other”.69 It
represents a shift away from the notion of the self as primarily subject to central control.70 As
Richardson argues, however, this is not necessarily as conceptually debilitating as one might
assume: “A distinct self does emerge, but through patterns of relationality rather than in
opposition from its other”.71
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The challenge to these generally accepted boundaries of the person raises obvious questions of
human agency.72 We are all organisms “assimilating, seeking, manipulating [our] worlds, even
as [we] accommodate and respond to them”.73 In other words, we are neither completely free
and autonomous, nor passive. The image of endocrine disruption constructed by scientists in
fact reinforces the idea that matter is inherently interactive, not inert. The metaphor of
hormones as messengers ‐‐ moving through the body, picking up ‘packages’ from the ‘outside’,
delivering them to receptive agents, igniting and transforming productive processes –
reinforces the understanding that bodies are dynamic systems.
As Richardson argues, a “refusal to delineate fixed boundaries between the self and its
supposed ‘outside’ offers a new approach to the law of obligations”.74 The focus on individuals
as the point of departure in tort law needs challenge. But that the fundamental entity of social
existence must be the individual is central to liberal thought: “we are individuals, because we
are separate from one another”.75 And this is not just in a physical sense, “what is important
for the liberal is that our individuation is normative”.76
We are individuals because we choose. Individualism is the foundation for the sacred liberal
values of choice, autonomy and self‐determination.77
One of the basic assumptions in tort law is that we are envisaged as individuals who are
owners of our own abilities, such as our ability to work and our bodies. If anyone
negligently injures us or prevent us from being able to earn a living we can claim
damages because we own parts of our bodies and life changes in a way that is
analogous to the way in which we own property.78
The declining sex ratio emerges as an eruption of unpredictability in a material world that is
otherwise tightly structured by forces external to the Band. Where the subjects of pollution are
not easily conceptualized as individual, liberal, monadic entities, but are instead understood as
a community embedded in cultural histories, tied to the land, and inseparable from local
intensities and flows, emitted particles, energies and connections operating on a molecular
level, we need a broader conception of the legal subject to adequately understand the harm.
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Why is “the individual person” the appropriate unit or level of analysis for assessing damages in
tort law? Why not assess it at the level of communities? Or conversely, at the molecular level?
At the level of cells? Legal scholars have begun exploring the idea that tort law is too corporeal
‐‐ that it is tethered too tightly to proof of physical damages‐‐ and should move towards the
recognition of ‘interests‐based’ damages in certain contexts.79 But even where recent
scholarship in tort has included some calls for expansion of what should count as harm or
‘physical damage’,80 the scale at which we look to find such damage remains locked at the level
of the individual, the single unitary legal subject.
Witting argues we should move away from assessing physical damage only on the basis of a
“factually observable” change in the physical structure of persons, and advocates for a more
contextual approach based on social perceptions of damage.81 As Nolan says, “the boundaries
of the concept of physical damage are not always clear”82 and could be expanded. This goes
some way towards opening up the question of what constitutes physical damage, but leaves
unexplored, for now, the matter of the appropriate scale on which we should measure it. In
what follows, I begin to brainstorm the way that various torts might operate at different scales
of injury to provide a remedy for the Aamjiwnaang people.
…If we take the injury to have occurred inside bodies, then perhaps we would turn to the tort of
battery…

B. OFFENSIVE CONTACT WITH THE BODY / BATTERY
Is there a right to physical integrity or bodily inviolability? Control over our bodies represents a
key feminist objective. The notion that we are individual autonomous bodies would seem to
demand that we are all able to “resist the intrusions of others”.83 Presumably this includes the
ability to say ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to bodily penetration by synthetic chemicals capable of causing
material changes to key metabolic processes within ourselves. So what if individual women in
79
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Aamjiwnaang can’t demonstrate a factually observable change; a visible and tangible harm?
Isn’t any interference with our bodies that we have not consented to capable of constituting a
harm?
Consider the tort of battery. It is said to protect a person’s right to be free from offensive
physical contacts. It guards the security of the person. The tort of battery “does not require
that the contact be physically harmful to its recipient, or cause any physical injury”.84
Apparently, any offensive contact qualifies, “however trivial it may seem”, if it has the potential
to affect dignity and self‐respect.85 It is the “right to autonomy over one’s own body which is
protected.”86
But to be actionable, the offensive contact must be either “intentional” or “negligent”. The
contact does not need to be “person‐to‐person” but it must be “physical”.87 In our example,
what would constitute the offensive contact? Is it the synthetic estrogens entering the body? Is
it when they bind to and activate receptors in cells? How can we attach intention to these
contacts?
We could point to offensive conduct, such as the release of chemicals into the air or water,
which we may be able to argue is intentional or negligent. An advantage of the tort of battery,
over the tort of negligence for example, is that the burden of disproving intention or negligence
falls on the defendant, once the elements of the tort are proven.88 Negligent battery is the
unreasonable disregard of a “foreseeable” risk of contact, even if the contact is not desired or
substantially certain to occur.89 The polluters would bear the burden of providing emission
data, dispersion models and epidemiological evidence; the polluters would have to argue that
the “contact” between their synthetic estrogens released freely into the air, and our estrogen
receptors, hiding deep in our own bodies, was not foreseeable, predictable, or inevitable.
Unfortunately, with the tort of battery, there is also a defence of legal authority. As mentioned,
most of the pollution in Sarnia’s Chemical Valley is legally authorized. The polluters have been
issued permits to emit. These certificates of approval constitute a legally binding license that
sets out the conditions under which a facility can operate. So, as long as the facility stays within
the maximum permissible contaminant emission levels as detailed in their permit, the defence
of legal authority seems likely to preclude any finding of liability.90
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…If we take the injury to have occurred to individuals, we would look to the tort of negligence,
and specifically, we might employ the “lost chance” doctrine…

C. LOST CHANCES / NEGLIGENCE
Where a plaintiff cannot establish that a defendant’s negligence “caused” her injury on a
balance of probabilities, her claim in negligence will fail. This is true even where the defendant’s
negligent conduct increased the possibility of her injury, but didn’t “probably” cause it.91 In the
case of Aamjiwnaang mothers (or fathers), if the “injury” was endocrine disruption, it seems
likely that causation would prove difficult to make out (“…this synthetic estrogen released by
this polluter entered my body and activated estrogen receptors at a key moment in the
embryo’s early development thus “causing” me to conceive an embryo that would become a
girl, instead of a boy…”). But what if we redefine the very nature of the injury itself? What if
the “lost chances” to bear sons is the harm? The effect of the synthetic chemicals in the body
produced ‐‐ caused ‐‐ an increased chance of conceiving an embryo that would become a girl
(given there was already, surely, an almost even chance of that outcome). According to this
narrative, the negligent actions of the polluters, which increased the possibility of endocrine
disruption, effectively deprived the families on the reserve of chances to welcome boys. The
lost chances themselves constitute the injury and the families are owed compensation.
Used more commonly in contract cases and increasingly in medical malpractice litigation, the
“lost chance” doctrine can compensate individuals for lost opportunities, based on probabilistic
estimates of what would have been expected in the absence of negligence – of what “could
have been”. So, if an agency improperly disqualifies a lottery ticket resulting in diminished
chances of winning, for example, or, if a doctor makes mistakes in the course of a person’s
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cancer treatment and, as a result the patient has a diminished chance of survival, there is the
possibility of recovery, in some jurisdictions92, for “lost chance.”93
For personal injury lawyers and litigators, the lost chance doctrine offers several advantages.
Most importantly, injury and compensation are understood in terms of “lost opportunity” or
heightened risk, rather than resting on an ultimate injury, concrete and visible in the body.94
Thus, the doctrine potentially provides a way around the difficult questions of causation and
harm that plague most toxic tort cases.95
Usually in these cases, however, it is unproblematically stated that the plaintiff has lost her
chance to avoid a preferred outcome – a more favourable result. For example, a leading
proponent of the doctrine in the US, Professor Joseph King, states that the loss of chance is the
loss of “achieving a favourable outcome or of avoiding an adverse consequence”.96 It rests on
the idea that “depriving a person of the chance of good results is in fact harmful to that
person”.97 Chance has value. But, does applying the doctrine to the declining sex ratio imply
that boy babies are preferred to girls? That a boy would constitute a more favourable result?
That a boy child is more valuable to families, to communities, than a girl child? How can we call
a failure to produce ‘boys’ a harm without de‐valuing girls?
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We might turn to the “wrongful birth” cases for insight in this regard.98 In these cases, parents
make claims in negligence for faulty sterilization procedures or incorrect contraception advice
that result in the birth of an unwanted child. Where a doctor’s negligence results in the birth of
a healthy child, a difficult issue arises with respect to the assessment of damages.99 Courts
have made surprising findings in this regard, stating categorically in one case that “the benefits
a child brings to a family outweigh the costs of that child to a family”.100 Apparently even
where the child was unwanted, the parents took specific steps to avoid its birth and it would
not have been born but‐for the negligence of a professional with a specific duty to prevent its
birth, a healthy child can still categorically be considered a blessing.101
In other cases, however, there is a different formulation of the harm. It is not that the child,
herself, is to be considered a harm, but that the negligent interference with autonomy, with
reproductive choice and control, is a harm that should be compensated for.102 What becomes
very clear in thinking through these questions is the difficulty with objective determinations of
harm. A healthy child, to some, is a blessing; to others, is a burden.
Perhaps the image that best exemplifies the nagging inadequacy of how we find a harm in the
Aamjiwnaang situation, is not the classic “lost chance” lottery ticket analogy (because money is
universally accepted as a desired outcome in the context of lotteries!) ‐‐ but a midway game at
a fair. Suppose that all of the prizes available for winners in the game are, objectively speaking,
“equal” in value. You win the game and spin the wheel to determine your prize. But suppose
the wheel is improperly weighted so that it is much less likely to stop on the prize that you
want. Someone has interfered with your autonomy. Never mind that it is with respect to an
outcome that you do not have full control over. There is an element of chance. This is true with
respect to reproduction, as it is true with respect to cancer and lotteries and midway games.
…What about a class action in lost chance? At the community level, for the denial of the chance
of continuing? Of reproducing and existing…
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As explored earlier, the harm suffered by the members of the Aamjiwnaang First Nation is
rendered visible through the “statistical vision” of epidemiology.103 At an individual level it
cannot be seen, yet in the aggregate, it is obvious. There is perhaps a parallel here to the issue
of pay equity.104 Just as individual Aamjiwnaang mothers, encountering doctors’ offices and
public health units with complaints of “so many girls” being born are easily dismissed, so
individual women encountering lawyers and bosses with complaints of “so little pay” are also
routinely dismissed. But at the level of the population the claims come into sharp relief, and
the imbalance, the unfairness, is exposed.
Once aggregated, they graduate from subjective claims into statistical correlations. The focus is
no longer on individual harm, but on probabilistic harm across disembodied populations. But in
exchange for the shift in focus that allows recognition of the aggregate harm, we forfeit detail
at the level of individual lives. In revealing the pattern, individual stories get lost. And here ‐‐
for both the depressed sex ratio and the depressed wages of women ‐‐ the shift has the
potential to overcome the tendency to dismiss each individual woman’s complaint as a result of
‘chance’ and to bring back into play the social origins of the problem and the blameworthiness
of those who perpetuate it.

D. REPARATION / RETRIBUTION
In each and every one of these imagined tort claims, it will always come down to a question of
remedy. The primary remedy in tort is money damages. In general, the aim is to translate the
lost intangibles into money terms, which involves not only tricky exercises in valuation, but also
a good deal of “fortune telling” in that it demands the prediction of future events. There is no
question that the tort system at present reflects and reinforces the view that money can
substitute for health.105 Jain calls this the “trope of compensation”.106 Based on the idea of
reparable harm, the legal logic demands that the injury be made calculable in market terms, so
that the injury can be “undone” through the monetary award of damages, and the injured can
“buy back” what was lost.107
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Can we “buy back” what’s been taken from the Aamjiwnaang community? This must be where
the parallel with pay equity breaks down. Pay equity can be addressed in money terms ‐‐ the
claims are actually about money. A depressed sex ratio is not about money; and it is only
tangentially about health. “Recovery”, in law, is meant to restore, repair or compensate a
victim as a matter of justice. It aims to return the injured person to the condition she would
have been in had the injury not occurred. The prospect of recovery for the Aamjiwnaang
community is what makes it very clear that the wound, in this case, is much deeper than the
injury ‐‐ the wound will never be closed by an award of damages (even if any were
forthcoming).
Can this ‘injury’ be reversed? Can a community ‘recover’ from endocrine disruption? There is
some ecological evidence that suggests it is likely that, at the population level at least, once the
key exposures stop, the effects of endocrine disruption will begin to reverse.108 If this is the
community’s goal, then the remedy best suited is not damages ‐‐ but injunction.
…Still conceiving of the injury to have occurred at the scale of the community, then, we might
also consider the tort of nuisance. Nuisance is attractive, at least conceptually, because the
remedies available include both damages and injunction…

E. BAD NEIGHBORS / NUISANCE
The tort of nuisance deals with relations between neighbors. Often, we think of neighbors in a
physical sense, as groups or individuals occupying adjacent pieces of land or at least being in a
permanent state of close proximity to each other, and generally, we acknowledge that
neighbors do not ‘choose’ each other. It seems likely that the Aamjiwnaang First Nation and the
Chemical Valley industry would meet this definition.109
There are two classes of claims in nuisance. The first, private nuisance, specifically addresses
unlawful interference with the use or enjoyment of land. What is “unlawful”? It is “substantial
and unreasonable” interference.110 The second, public nuisance, applies when environmental
harm generally affects a large class of people at the same time. For public nuisance, a plaintiff
can only succeed if she suffers “special injury” in the nature of personal injury or property
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damage. The First Nation interest in land on reserve is considered only “possessory” – but that
has been found to be sufficient to ground a claim for nuisance.111
On the surface, it seems that there are good arguments for the Aamjiwnaang under both
branches of nuisance law. Under private nuisance, however, the Band would have to overcome
the hurdle of “lawfulness” or “legal authority”, as discussed earlier. Under public nuisance, the
Band would be returned to the problem of proving a personal injury. For these reasons,
nuisance law has proven relatively impotent in fights between communities and industry.112
Further, the “wrong” would essentially lie in the violation of property rights, not interference
with bodily integrity. As a result, even without assessing the loss in terms of money damages, it
remains a commodification of the body, and of community, because it relegates those interests
to the property interest.
This discussion has skimmed over the question of whether compensation is the only legitimate
goal of tort law.113 What about justice, deterrence, education, punishment of carelessness,
retribution? In fact, in early conceptions of tort law, it was the victim’s vengeance that was said
to have been “purchased” by the offer of compensation. Money flowed from the aggressor to
the victim, essentially in exchange for community peace.114 On reflection, it seems that, of all
of these potential aims of tort law, compensation is the only one that really turns on the
relationship between individuals – the others are more open to alternative conceptions of
harm, and alternative scales at which to find injury.115

IV. CONCLUSIONS
Contemporary pollution harms are pervasive, diffuse, body‐altering, cumulative and
generational in character; the links between those harms and the suspected chemical culprits
are tenuous and contested; and further, the harms are not randomly distributed, or uniformly
experienced. Tort law in its current form falls short of capturing the essence of this pollution
because, in transforming it into a form cognizable by law, we are forced to locate the harm in
separate, autonomous individuals. As Alan Hyde notes, “law’s discourse of the body constructs
the body as a thing, separate from the person, but the bearer of that person…The legal subject
is an individual, and so is that subject’s body. Each body is an individuated entity with distinct
boundaries, an outside and an inside”.116
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Tort law, conventionally conceived, is an expression of the “liberal preference for non‐
intervention by the state into social arrangements”.117 It offers a private law solution, between
individuals; it is utterly unable to account for way the pollution has saturated the community,
been soaked up in bodies, and dissolved boundaries between selves and others. But
brainstorming around tort law’s potential remedies, at various scales, allows for the body to be
opened up – the gender‐bending synthetic chemicals flowing through bodies become visible,
and the way they freely move between individuals and their worlds is exposed to the point that
our insistence on a fixed bodily boundary, and a centrally controlled self, begins to break down.
In fact, as the analysis above demonstrates, the scale at which we conceive of an ‘injury’ shapes
the determination of whether the injury is seen as “remediable”, and on what terms. Further,
as Felstiner, Abel and Sarat demonstrated almost 30 years ago, these conceptions and
determinations are implicit in the process of “naming”, which shapes ideas about the allocation
of blame for the harm.118 Accordingly, just as Alan Hyde shows how various constructions of the
body in jurisprudence carry consequences for actual persons119, here we see that our own
constructions of ‘injury’ – where and how we choose to find it ‐‐ carry consequences for
communities affected by contemporary pollution harms. In fact, in all likelihood, they carry
consequences for the just resolution of many other ‘injuries’ for which we currently do not
recognize a remedy.
As White shows (this issue), whether or not an ‘injury’ will indelibly mark its subject is
indeterminable. To say that the harm itself is collective is to open it up to a trajectory that
depends on actors outside of the subject. Further, as Galanter argues, there is a mutually
constitutive relationship between injuries and remedies, such that the remedy itself, or the
process of seeking the remedy, or of negotiating a path forward without a remedy, all may
institute a process of healing, at various scales, that transforms the injury.120
Alan Hyde argues that we should strive for a law and politics of embodied subjects.121 As legal
speakers, we choose when and how to “configure the body in relationship to others”.122 In our
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tort jurisprudence, in our determinations of what may count as ‘harm’, we need a
jurisprudence that is truer to human experience. The task, as Leslie Bender frames it, is only to
imagine creative new remedies that can work to restore dignity and social equality, and
remedies that acknowledge collective harms based on the interconnectedness of life.123
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